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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission:
You Can't Always Get What You
Want, But Sometimes You
Get What You Need
Timothy A. Bittle*
I. INTRODUCTION
Pat Nollan is a deputy city. attorney for the City of Los Angeles.
As a lawyer whose job it is to advise and defend city government in
its legal affairs, Pat is well acquainted with the latitude government
enjoys when exercising its authority to regulate land use. The fact
that Pat Nollan fought the State of California all the way to the
United States Supreme Court to challenge a land use condition im-
posed on his property is perhaps a commentary on how far modern
regulations had encroached upon traditional principles of property
rights. Property rights emerged victorious, however, in the far-reach-
ing opinion rendered by the Supreme Court in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission.1
The fifth amendment guarantees the payment of just compensation
to one whose private property is taken for public use.2 At issue in
Nollan was the extent to which the fifth amendment limits the abil-
ity of government to condition the granting of building permits upon
the applicants' dedication of property to the public without compen-
sation. This question had never been decided by the Supreme Court.
It generated substantial interest and concern, including amicus curiae
briefs on behalf of the United States, twenty-nine individual states,
* The author is a staff attorney at Pacific Legal Foundation in Sacramento, Cali-
fornia. He was co-counsel for the Nollans while the case was in the state courts and in
the United States Supreme Court.
1. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment is made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
fifty-two California cities and counties, the Council of State Govern-
ments, the United States Conference of Mayors, the National Associ-
ation of Counties, and the National League of Cities.
The court in Nollan announced a new constitutional test for re-
viewing permit conditions which sets definite limits on how far pri-
vate land use can be conditioned by government in the future. This
article will discuss California "takings" jurisprudence before and
after Nollan, and will specifically discuss the mechanics of the
Supreme Court's new test.
II. THE NOLLAN FACTS
Pat Nollan and his wife, Marilyn, were lessees of an ocean-front lot
in a custom home subdivision known as Faria Beach, in north Ven-
tura County. Their lessor, the Faria Family Trust, had subdivided
the tract and remained active as a homeowners' association and ar-
chitectural review board.
When the lease commenced, the lot was occupied by a small one-
bedroom house which the Nollans rented to summer vacationers.
However, after several years of rental use, off-season vandalism, and
ocean storms, the building had fallen into serious disrepair and could
no longer be rented out. The Nollans' lease was scheduled to expire
on a certain date, but included an option to purchase the property if
certain conditions were met. Among those conditions was a require-
ment that the Nollans remove the existing structure and submit
plans for its replacement with a larger home in keeping with the rest
of the neighborhood.
With the lease's expiration date approaching, the Nollans decided
to exercise their option to buy the property. On February 25, 1982, in
accordance with California law, the Nollans submitted an application
to the California Coastal Commission, requesting a permit to demol-
ish the existing structure and replace it with a modern three-bed-
room home for themselves. The proposed home complied with all
existing restrictions for the property and did not require any vari-
ances or special approvals. The Nollans had already obtained all nec-
essary permits from the county, but since their lot lay within the
coastal zone,3 they were also required by the California Coastal Act 4
to obtain a coastal development permit from the Commission.5
Initially, the Nollans' application was treated as a routine approval
with conditions. Their permit was granted without a hearing. Be-
cause the Coastal Act requires that "[p]ublic access from the nearest
3. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30150-30176 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988) (defining coastal
zone).
4. Id. §§ 30000-30950.
5. Id. § 30600(a).
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public roadway to the shoreline and along the coast shall be provided
in new development projects .... ,"6 the Commission attached a condi-
tion to the permit which required the Nollans to convey an easement
to the state granting access to the public across the entire beach area
of their property, approximately one-third of the lot. The dedication
of this strip of beach was intended to allow people walking along the
shoreline to continue their walk across the Nollans' beach without
trespassing.
The Nollans filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus 7
challenging the access condition. The Ventura County Superior
Court agreed that blind adherence to the access requirements of the
Coastal Act could lead to unconstitutional results, and accordingly re-
manded the case to the Commission with instructions to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to consider the justification for requiring a grant
of access in the case.8 The court advised the Commission that it
''may constitutionally require a grant of public access only when the
facts in the case before it demonstrate that a proposed development
will place a burden on public access to the coast."9
On remand, following a public hearing, the Commission found that
the increased size of the new house would interfere with the public's
ability to view the ocean from the road, thus preventing the public
"psychologically ... from realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby
that they have every right to visit,"'10 resulting in additional public
use at other more visible areas of the coast.' Based on these find-
ings, the Commission voted to retain the access condition.12
The Nollans returned to court with another administrative manda-
mus petition. Again, the superior court ruled in favor of the Nollans,
repeating its previously articulated standard that the Commission's
authority to impose public access requirements as a condition to per-
6. Id. § 30212.
7. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988) (describing proce-
dure for review of administrative orders or decisions).
8. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. SP 50805 Civ. (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan.
18, 1983), rev'd, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 3141
(1987).
9. Id.
10. Joint Appendix at 58, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141
(1987) (No. 86-133). The public may rightfully use the beach seaward of the mean
high-tide line. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 324, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr.
790, 796 (1971); CAL. CIV. CODE § 670 (West 1982) (state owns land below ordinary
high-water mark).
11. Joint Appendix at 58, Nollan (No. 86-133).
12. See Nollan, No. SP 50805 Civ. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 1984).
mit approval is limited to situations where the applicant's proposed
development will have an adverse impact on public access to the sea.
This time the court ordered the Commission to issue the Nollans'
permit without the access condition.13
The Commission appealed the order and on January 24, 1986, the
California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, holding that
under California law no such justification need be shown to validate
an exaction of property in the regulatory context. 14 Although the
court of appeal agreed that the "Nollans' project ha[d] not created
the need for access to the tidelands fronting their property,"15 it nev-
ertheless concluded that "[s]ince a direct burden on public access
need not be demonstrated ... "16 the trial court ruling was in error.
The court held that "the justification for required dedication is not
limited to the needs of or burdens created by the project."'17
The court of appeal then applied what it believed to be the proper
constitutional analysis. It determined that the Commission was re-
quired by the Coastal Act to demand a dedication of property from
the Nollans, and that the particular condition imposed carried out the
purpose and mandate of the Act.l8 The court then considered
whether the condition caused a "taking" and reasoned that it did not
because even though the condition caused a diminution in the value
of the Nollans' property, it did not deprive them of the reasonable
use of the property.19
When the California Supreme Court denied review, the Nollans ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court. Probable jurisdiction
was noted by the Court on October 20, 1986.20
III. THE LAW IN CALIFORNIA PRIOR TO NOLLAN
The court of appeal's decision in Nollan represented the final step
of an evolution in the law with respect to permit exactions in the
California courts. Historically, California courts had borrowed from
the law governing nuisance abatement and benefit assessments when
reviewing permit exactions. Just as compensation is not owed when
government prohibits a particular noxious use of an owner's prop-
erty,21 the California courts saw no need to compensate the owner
13. Id. at 8.
14. Nollan, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
15. Id. at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 724, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
19. Id. at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
20. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143 (1987).
21. See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. App. 3d 317, 321, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 93, 95 (1975); Yen Eng v. Board of Bldg. and Safety Comm'rs, 184 Cal. App. 2d
514, 520-21, 7 Cal. Rptr. 564, 568 (1960); Morton v. Superior Court of San Mateo, 124
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when an acquisition of the property was necessary to cure some gen-
eral public harm caused by development of the owner's property.
Similarly, as the law relating to assessments allows an owner to be
taxed in order to provide public improvements that will specially
benefit the property,22 the California courts considered it proper for
government to require land developers to dedicate property for
streets, parks, and the like that would specially benefit their develop-
ments. Aside from these situations, however, it was considered un-
constitutional for government to condition the granting of permits on
the applicant's dedication of land.23
The landmark case in this area was Ayres v. City Council of Los
Angeles.24 In Ayres, the city council required an uncompensated ded-
ication of land for street-widening purposes as a condition to the ap-
proval of a subdivision.25 The subdivider attacked the condition as
constituting an unconstitutional taking of private property. 26 The
court found that: (1) development of the subdivision would generate
traffic and cause traffic hazards necessitating the widening of the
boulevard;27 (2) the widening would benefit the ultimate lot owners;28
and (3) without the widening, the proposed subdivision would not be
feasible. 29 Based upon these findings, the court rejected the land-
owner's constitutional challenge to the exaction, stating, "[W]here it
is a condition reasonably related to increased traffic and other needs
of the proposed subdivision it is voluntary in theory and not contrary
to constitutional concepts." 30 Thus, Ayres allowed the imposition of
subdivision conditions requiring the uncompensated dedication of
Cal. App. 2d 577, 581-82, 269 P.2d 81, 84-85 (1954). But see Goldblatt v. Town of Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 590, 593-94 (1962) (prohibition of noxious uses of property does not re-
quire compensation provided the regulation is not so onerous as to constitute a taking);
Holtz v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 305, 475 P.2d 441, 446, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 345, 350 (1970) (compensation is not required for a taking or damaging of prop-
erty only when the governmental action is under emergency conditions to avert im-
pending peril).
22. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 11
Cal. 2d 395, 401, 80 P.2d 479, 481 (1938); Spring St. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 170 Cal.
24, 30, 148 P. 217, 219 (1915).
23. See, e.g., Liberty v. California Coastal Comm'n, 113 Cal. App. 3d, 491, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1980); Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. County of San Joaquin, 257 Cal.
App. 2d 181, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967).
24. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
25. Id. at 34, 207 P.2d at 3.
26. Id. at 35, 207 P.2d at 3.
27. Id. at 38-39, 207 P.2d at 5-6.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 40, 207 P.2d at 6-7.
30. Id. at 42, 207 P.2d at 8.
property, but only when the conditions were imposed to serve the
needs of the new residents or to mitigate public harms created by the
new development. At least that is how Ayres was interpreted for the
next twenty years.31
Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Manufacturing v. County of San Joa-
quin,3 2 another street-improvement case, so interpreted Ayres when
it invalidated a dedication requirement with this statement:
It is clear to us from this record that the conditions imposed upon Mid-Way
are not so imposed because of any of its activities relating to... the sometime-
to-be-built four-lane expressway.... They were imposed because respondents
seem to conceive that the burden of the cost of access and highway widening
rights of way and the cost of interchanges generally can be shifted by govern-
ment onto adjoining landowners .... [However,] D]ustification of conditions
depends upon there being some real relationship between the thing wanted by
the landowner from government and the quid pro quo exacted by government
therefor. 3 3
Another case following this view of Ayres was Scrutton v. County
of Sacramento,34 which recited the Ayres rule as follows:
"[C]onditions imposed on the grant of land use applications are valid
if reasonably conceived to fulfill public needs emanating from the
landowner's proposed use."35
The rule developed by this line of cases was greatly eroded in 1971
by the California Supreme Court in Associated Home Builders, Inc. v.
City of Walnut Creek.36 Associated Home Builders involved a facial
challenge to a statute authorizing municipalities to require parkland
dedications from subdividers.3 7 The court found the test for constitu-
tionality articulated in Mid-Way and Scrutton satisfied in that the
exactions authorized by the statute were necessary to fulfill the need
for additional parkland created by the types of subdivisions that
would be subject to the statute. 38 In dicta, however, the court rein-
terpreted Ayres and indicated that a dedication requirement would
be valid even if it did not meet the Mid-Way/Scrutton standard of
review:
We do not find in Ayres support for the principle urged by Associated that a
dedication requirement may be upheld only if the particular subdivision cre-
ates the need for dedication.
Even if it were not for the authority of Ayers [sic] we would have no doubt
that section 11546 can be justified on the basis of a general public need for rec-
reational facilities ... 39
As to the question of whether a taking could occur under the guise of
31. See infra text accompanying notes 32-68.
32. 257 Cal. App. 2d 181, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967).
33. Id. at 191-92, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
34. 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
35. Id. at 421, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
36. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
37. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66477, 66479 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
38. Associated Home Builders, 4 Cal. 3d at 641, 484 P.2d at 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
39. Id. at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
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subdivision regulation, the court expressly stated that a municipality
requiring a dedication of land in the permit context is "not acting in
eminent domain."40
Although subtle, this language in Associated Home Builders elimi-
nated the need for applying a case-by-case takings analysis to cases
involving uncompensated dedication conditions. Such exactions were
given general sanction as being constitutional. The scope of judicial
inquiry in such cases was instead limited to a police power analysis,
i.e., government may require dedications of private property without
compensation so long as the legislature makes a finding that a "gen-
eral public need" for the exaction is present. 41
The first case to apply the dicta in Associated Home Builders to a
case in which the Mid-Way/Scrutton standard was not satisfied was
Norsco Enterprises v. City of Fremont.42 In Norsco, the city levied
fees in lieu of a dedication of parkland against the owner of an apart-
ment building who had converted the apartments into condomini-
ums. The owner argued that the mere conversion of apartment units
into a condominium form of ownership did not change the population
of the building and, therefore, the influx of new residents found in
Associated Home Builders was not present.43 The court held, how-
ever, that it was unnecessary for the city to show that Norsco had
contributed to the need for parkland:
[In Associated Home Builders] the high court pointed out that population
growth brought about by a proposed subdivision was not the only justification
for the statute. It rejected an argument, such as that made here, that the re-
quired land dedication or "in lieu fees" were "justified only if it can be shown
that the need for additional park and recreational facilities is attributable to
... the new subdivision .... 44
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Commission 45 became
the first case to extend the Associated Home Builders rule to an ap-
plication for permission to use land, rather than an application for
permission to subdivide land.46 This was a significant expansion of
40. Id.
41. For a comment agreeing with this interpretation of Ayres by Associated Home
Builders, see Comment, Land Development and the Environment: The Subdivision
Map Act, 5 PAC. L.J. 55 (1974) ("The Ayres case demonstrates that benefit to the com-
munity ... and not some special relationship to the subdivision, is required for a valid
dedication requirement." Id. at 83).
42. 54 Cal. App. 3d 488, 126 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1976).
43. Id. at 493-94, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
44. Id. at 494, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 662 (emphasis in original).
45. 132 Cal. App. 3d 678, 183 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1982).
46. Norsco was a subdivision case. In California, a condominium conversion is a
subdivision. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66424 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
the Associated Home Builders rule. Although owners have no consti-
tutional right to subdivide land,47 they do have a right to make eco-
nomically viable use of their land in accordance with their reasonable
investment-backed expectations. 4 8
In Georgia-Pacific, a lumber company applied for coastal develop-
ment permits to make certain improvements to its lumber mill prop-
erty on the north coast of California. Among the proposed
improvements were the construction of a visitor service facility, park-
ing lot, helicopter pad, hangar, and related outbuildings. The Coastal
Commission granted the permits, but conditioned them upon the
company's dedicating specified easements to the public for access to
the shoreline. The trial court struck the conditions, ruling that the
public access conditions imposed by the Commission violated the
Takings Clause "in that the scope and extent of the easements re-
quired to be dedicated... [were] not reasonably related to the nature
and impact of the four projects proposed by Georgia-Pacific." 49
The appellate court reversed the trial court and reinstated the con-
ditions, reciting the rule that would eventually be applied to the Nol-
lans' case by the court of appeal:
A regulatory body may constitutionally require a dedication of property in the
interests of the general welfare as a condition' of permitting land development.
It does not act in eminent domain when it does this, and the validity of the
dedication requirement is not dependent on a factual showing that the devel-
opment has created the need for it. (Associated Home Builders, etc., Inc. v.
City of Walnut Creek .... ) The "scope and extent" of the easements required
by the Commission were "reasonably related" to one of the principal objec-
tives of the Coastal Act, which is to provide for maximum access to the coast
by all the people of this State. [citation omitted] Their relationship to the "na-
ture and impact" of the proposed projects was not a valid basis for the trial
court's determination that the access conditions deprived Georgia-Pacific of its
constitutional rights.5 0
Georgia-Pacific made it clear that California courts were testing
the validity of exactions-not by looking at the relationship between
the exaction and the landowner's proposed use-but by focusing
solely on the relationship between the exaction and the statute au-
thorizing the exaction.
Subsequently, a case was decided which set the stage for Nollan.
47. See Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 328, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 685, 691 (1981); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 15 Cal. 3d
508, 516, 542 P.2d 237, 241-43, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 369-70 (1975) (citing with approval
Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 602, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710
(1967)); Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 638, 484 P.2d
606, 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634 (1971); cf. Furey v. City of Sacramento, 592 F. Supp. 463,
469 (E.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that the property rights protected by the Takings Clause are
those property rights created by state law.").
48. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980).
49. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 132 Cal. App. 3d at 689 n.7, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 401 n.7.
50. Id. at 699, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
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Grupe v. California Coastal Commission5l involved an individual
who simply wished to construct one single-family home on a pre-sub-
divided, vacant, residentially zoned lot he had purchased.52 The
Coastal Commission attached a condition to Grupe's development
permit which effectively required him to dedicate the seaward two-
thirds of his lot to the public.5 3 Grupe argued that although Associ-
ated Home Builders and its progeny established that, as a general
proposition, government permit-issuing agencies may constitutionally
require uncompensated dedications of land, the federal takings cases
entitled him to a separate takings analysis addressed to the particular
circumstances of his case. 54 The court of appeal quoting Georgia-Pa-
cific agreed that, as a general proposition, exactions were considered
constitutional. 55 The court went on, however, to conduct a further
takings analysis, referring to the factors listed by the United States
Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York. 56 The court then ruled that although the acquisition of
Grupe's land was designed to accomplish a uniquely public function,5 7
and despite the fact that the public function could properly be char-
acterized as a physical invasion of Grupe's property,5 8 Grupe was
nonetheless left with a reasonable use of his property59 and "has re-
ceived a substantial benefit by being allowed to proceed with the de-
velopment of his property." 60 The court held in favor of the
Commission finding that the latter two factors outweighed the for-
mer two. 61
Grupe was the first case to reintroduce a takings analysis in a Cali-
fornia permit exaction case. The analysis employed, however, did not
focus on the relationship between the exaction and the proposed de-
51. 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).
52. Id. at 155, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
53. Id. at 156, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
54. Id. at 173, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
55. Id. at 172, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
56. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn Central identified "several factors that have particu-
lar significance" for determining whether government-caused losses amount to a "tak-
ing" in a particular case, including "[tihe economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations [and] the character of the governmental action."
Id. at 124. Another factor is whether government actions are properly characterized as
"acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions." Id. at 128.
57. Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 176, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 175-76, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 595-96.
60. Id. at 176-77, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97.
61. Id. at 177, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
velopment, as was done in the Mid-Way/Scrutton line of cases.
Rather, the Grupe takings analysis presupposed that dedication re-
quirements should be reviewed in the same manner as regulations
which restrict use.62
The appellate court in Nollan found the Grupe decision to be "dis-
positive" 63 in requiring affirmation of the Commission's decision to
impose an exaction on the Nollans. Following the Grupe analysis,
the Nollan court recited the general rule articulated in Georgia-Pa-
cific that "the justification for required dedication is not limited to
the needs of or burdens created by the project."64 The appellate
court added for emphasis that "[h]ere the Nollans' project has not
created the need for access to the tidelands fronting their property
"65
The court then looked at the relationship between the exaction
and the purposes of the Coastal Act, and found that the one carried
out the other.66 The court emphasized that the nature of the Nol-
lans' project was not the focus of attention: "This case and Grupe dif-
fer in that Grupe involved construction of a residence on one of the
few remaining vacant lots in the area. The difference is irrelevant."67
Finally, the court considered separately, as did Grupe, whether ap-
plication of the condition to the Nollans caused a taking. The court's
treatment of the issue, however, was terse; the court simply referred
to the result in Grupe: "The Grupe court also held that the exaction
did not constitute a 'taking' because although it caused a diminution
in the value of Grupe's property, it did not deprive him of the reason-
able use of his property."68
To summarize the evolution of law in this area, the court of ap-
peal's decision in Nollan confirmed that permit exactions enjoyed a
presumption of constitutionality; that the particular exaction passed
62. Compare Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (regulation of
owner's use is valid if regulation substantially advances legitimate state interest and
owner retains economically viable use) with Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Co., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982) (physical occupation is a per se taking without
regard to whether owner retains an economically viable use).
63. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 723, 223 Cal. Rptr.
28, 30 (1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 724, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
67. Id. at 723-24, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
68. Id. at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 31 (citation omitted). It could be argued that the
court of appeal in Nollan did not in fact give the Nollans a separate takings analysis
(the way the Grupe court had) because it was not directed to " 'the particular circum-
stances [of the Nollans'] case.'" Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978). Rather, the "analysis" was merely a recital of the conclusion reached
in the analysis of Grupe's facts. Viewing Nollan in this way, it is a throwback to Geor-
gia-Pacific and Norsco which had accepted as a general rule that no taking could occur
as a result of an exaction, and therefore no form of individual analysis was necessary.
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constitutional muster if it was a valid exercise of the police power,
and it left the owner with a reasonable use of his property. The need
to tie the exaction to the owner's project, as required by the Mid-
Way/Scrutton line of cases, was no longer recognized because exac-
tions were no longer viewed as a tool of mitigation in the event the
project created public harm. Rather, exactions had come to be
viewed as a quid pro quo for the benefit received when government
permitted an owner to build on his private land. In the opinion that
reversed the court of appeal in Nollan, the United States Supreme
Court swept away this body of California law and established a much
stricter test for reviewing the constitutionality of permit exactions.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW TEST
A. Step One
The constitutional analysis, or "test," employed by the Supreme
Court in Nollan starts at Section II of the opinion.6 9 The Court be-
gins with a fundamental premise. The premise is that uncompen-
sated dedication requirements, standing alone, are unconstitutional:
"Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement
across their beachfront available to the public ... rather than condi-
tioning their permit .... we have no doubt there would have been a
taking."70 So, for example, if the Nollans had never applied for a
permit, but had simply received a notice in the mail from the state
requiring them to dedicate their beachfront, there would have been a
per se taking.
This fundamental premise is in turn based upon the "character of
the governmental action."71 An unprovoked dedication requirement,
even an easement for public access, is a physical invasion. In
Loretto,7 2 the court observed:
[WIhere governmental action results in "[a] permanent physical occupation"
of the property, by the government itself or by others . . . "our cases uni-
formly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to
whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal
economic impact on the owner .. " We think a "permanent physical occupa-
tion" has occurred, for purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property
may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is per-
69. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145.
70. Id.
71. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added).
72. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
mitted to station himself permanently upon the premises.
7 3
Having observed that requiring an uncompensated conveyance of
the easement outside the permit context would be a taking, the
Court then posed the question, "whether requiring it to be conveyed
as a condition for issuing a land use permit alters the outcome." 74
Presumably, the outcome would be altered if issuance of the permit
amounted to just compensation for the exaction. The reader will re-
call that this idea had been accepted by the California courts. The
court in Grupe, citing Associated Home Builders, stated that an
owner receives "a substantial benefit by being allowed to proceed
with the development of his property ... in return for ... [being re-
quired] to dedicate a portion of his land. . .."75
The Supreme Court in Nollan, however, rejected this idea out of
hand: "[T]he right to build on one's own property--even though its
exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements-
cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit.' "76
Alternatively, the outcome might be altered if, by virtue of being
attached to a permit, the "character" of the exaction were changed
from a physical invasion to a lesser form of interference that does not
constitute a taking per se. The Supreme Court accepted this proposi-
tion and found that in some situations, requiring the exaction as a
condition for issuing a land use permit may change the character of
the exaction from a physical invasion to a legitimate regulation. The
Court stated: "We have long recognized that land use regulation does
not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state inter-
ests' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his
land.' "77
Thus, the Court recognized that an exaction can be either a physi-
cal invasion (in which case it is a taking per se) or a legitimate regu-
lation (in which case it may or may not be a taking).78 The theory is
elementary. The Court assumes that some permit applications may
be conditioned while others may not. Specifically, where the denial
of a permit would leave the owner with no economically viable use
for his property, the denial would constitute a taking. Such a permit
73. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 3146 (emphasis added).
75. Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 176-77, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 578, 596-97 (1985) (citing Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4
Cal. 3d 633, 644, 484 P.2d 606, 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 639 (1971)).
76. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146 n.2.
77. Id. at 3146 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
78. The Court does not express its decision in these terms until near the end of
the opinion, when in summary it states: "In short, unless the permit condition serves
the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not
a valid regulation of land use, but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.' " Id. at 3148 (cita-
tion omitted).
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is unconditionable-it cannot be withheld: "We assume, without de-
ciding, that .. .the Commission... would be able to deny the Nol-
lans their permit outright . . .unless the denial would interfere so
drastically with the Nollans' use of their property as to constitute a
taking."79
When the permit is unconditionable for this reason, there is no dif-
ference between receiving a dedication notice in the mail, and en-
countering the dedication requirement as a "condition" to the
granting of a permit. Since the permit may not be conditioned, the
presence of the permit is a red herring; or in the Court's words, its
presence does not "alter the outcome."80 The exaction in these cases
is tantamount to a physical invasion and is thus treated as a taking
per se.
On the other hand, under circumstances where the permit may
constitutionally be denied, because doing so would not leave the
owner without a reasonable use of the property, then the permit may
also be granted upon conditions. An exaction is not properly charac-
terized as a physical invasion in these circumstances because the
owner can choose to refuse the conditioned permit without forfeiting
his constitutional right of reasonable use. In these circumstances, an
exaction condition is properly treated as a type of regulation.
The above analysis will hereinafter be referred to as the "first
step" of the Nollan test. For a dedication condition to pass this step,
the governmental agency must have the lawful right to deny the per-
mit being applied for. Clearing the hurdle of this first prerequisite
does not guarantee, however, that the permit may be conditioned
upon any and every requirement the agency dreams up. The particu-
lar condition must also pass step two.
B. Step Two
Once it is determined that a permit denial would still leave the
landowner with an economically viable use, it does not necessarily
follow that the permit can therefore be denied for any reason. For
example, a permit could not be denied because the applicant's skin
color is black. Nor could the agency deny a permit for purely arbi-
trary reasons, such as a feeling by the agency that the applicant is al-
ready rich enough and does not need the profits that would be
generated by this project. Rather, a denial must advance a legitimate
79. Id. at 3147 (emphasis added).
80. See supra text accompanying note 74.
governmental interest.8 1 As to what governmental interests would
justify denial of a land use permit, the Court in Nollan said: "Our
cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what con-
stitutes a 'legitimate state interest' . . . .They have made clear, how-
ever, that a broad range of governmental purposes [qualify]."s 2
In deciding Nollan, the Court assumed8 3 that "among these permis-
sible purposes are protecting the public's ability to see the beach, as-
sisting the public in overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to using
the beach created by a developed shorefront, and preventing conges-
tion on the public beaches."8 4 Presumably, however, not all effects of
a project are of sufficient significance to justify complete denial of
the project. Only those effects that are significant enough to justify
outright denial may form the basis for a condition requiring a dedica-
tion of land.8 5
Once a permitting agency has decided that a land use project
should be denied as proposed, and the agency's reasons advance a le-
gitimate governmental interest, the agency is free at that point to
deny the permit. The Court held in Nollan that the agency is also
free at that point, as an alternative, to grant the permit with condi-
tions: "The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves
the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the
permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the
permit would not constitute a taking. We agree."8 6
This quote makes it clear, however, that the condition selected by
the agency must be one "that serves the same legitimate police-power
purpose as a refusal to issue the permit."8 7 Thus, if the legitimate
reason for denying a permit is that the project will block ocean views,
the agency may, in substitution for the denial, grant the permit with
a condition that preserves ocean views:
Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some condition that would
have protected the public's ability to see the beach notwithstanding construc-
tion of the new house-for example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or
a ban on fences-so long as the Commission could have exercised its police
power (as we have assumed it could) to forbid construction of the house alto-
gether, imposition of the condition would also be constitutional.
8 8
Thus, even a condition that requires the dedication of land would
be constitutional if it alleviates public impacts of the project that
could instead have been alleviated by outright denial of permission to
carry out the project.
81. Id. at 3146-47.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 3147.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 3148.
86. Id. at 3147.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 3147-48.
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By limiting agencies' ability to impose conditions solely to situa-
tions in which the anticipated effects of a proposed project would jus-
tify the project's denial, the potential for abuse of the permit
granting' power is greatly reduced. If, on the other hand, agencies
had the power to exchange permits for unrelated transfers of money
or land, that power in the wrong hands could be abused. Permits
crucial to important projects of wealthy corporate applicants could be
withheld until the applicant provided a host of amenities which the
public wanted but was not willing to pay taxes for. More and more
areas of life might become regulated, with more and more opportuni-
ties for extortion. These dangers were anticipated and curtailed by
the Nollan Court in adopting this aspect of its test. After Nollan,
government agencies cannot always get what they want, but if they
pass step one, they can get what they need.
The condition imposed must advance the same interests that justify
denial. The extent to which the condition must do so was spelled out
by the Court as follows:
[O]ur cases describe the condition for abridgement of property rights through
the police power as a "substantial advanc[ing]" of a legitimate State interest.
We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the actual
conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land use restric-
tion, since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoid-
ance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police power
objective.8 9
Applying this standard to the facts of the Nollan case, the Court
stated:
[H]ere, the lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of
the building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it
was .... It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people
already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property
reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house.9 0
The dissenting Justices criticized the majority for employing this
heightened level of judicial scrutiny.91 But to the extent weight is
given to their interpretations of the majority opinion, the dissenting
Justices may help to define the relationship that must exist between
an exaction condition and a harmful aspect of the project which
could have justified its denial. Justice Brennan described the re-
quired nexus as "a precise match between the condition imposed and
the specific type of burden . . . created by the [proposed use],"92 and
89. Id. at 3150 (emphasis in original).
90. Id. at 3148-49.
91. Id. at 3151 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 3154.
also as "a precise quid pro quo of burdens and benefits .... 93 Jus-
tice Blackmun referred to the standard as an "'eye for an eye'" re-
quirement,94 reflecting a "rigid interpretation of the necessary
correlation between a burden created by development and a condi-
tion imposed. . .. "95
The Court's emphasis on the importance of a proper nexus was un-
doubtedly provoked by Justice Brennan's suggestion that government
agencies (like the Coastal Commission) should have little difficulty
conjuring up adverse effects of a project in order to meet the Court's
new requirements. 96 Justice Brennan's skepticism is curious, given
the majority's requirement that the purpose served by the exaction
must be one that justifies "forbid[ding] construction of the house al-
together."97 In response to his skepticism, however, the majority
makes it clear that courts are not to accept agency rationales for ex-
actions on their face; the courts are under a constitutional obligation
to take a closer look.
C. Summary of the New Test
The first step can be viewed as a trade.98 Since outright dedication
requirements are unconstitutional, the property owner has a right to
resist the dedication condition. However, in circumstances where the
agency has a lawful right to deny the owner's permit, the owner and
the agency may lawfully trade their rights. That is, the agency can
agree to issue a permit for the owner's project provided the owner ac-
cepts a dedication requirement. If, on the other hand, the agency
cannot deny the permit, because to disallow the requested use would
be a taking, then the agency has nothing to trade, and no exaction is
permissible. Thus, to get beyond step one, the agency must be able to
justify an outright denial of the applicant's permit.
In situations where the agency can justify denial of the applicant's
permit, an exaction attached as a condition to the permit will be law-
ful if a legitimate governmental interest is being substantially ad-
vanced by the exaction. A legitimate governmental interest is one
that would justify outright denial of the permit. Thus, step two can
be analogized to contract law where courts examine for adequacy the
consideration given by a promisee. Under Nollan, the reviewing
court must examine the trade made by the parties in step one to en-
93. Id. at 3160 (emphasis in original).
94. Id. at 3162 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 3161 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 3148.
98. Cf. id. at 3146 n.2 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) for
the proposition that property rights which cannot be "taken" by government can none-
theless be the subject of a voluntary "exchange").
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sure that the exaction was imposed by the agency to alleviate effects
of the project which would have justified permit denial. An exaction
which passes both steps of this new test is valid.
V. THE LAW IN CALIFORNIA AFTER NOLLAN
Nollan obviously changed the law relating to permit exactions. In-
stead of beginning with a presumption of constitutionality, as recent
California cases had done,99 the Supreme Court set out with a pre-
sumption that, due to their physical invasion character, demands for
dedication are unconstitutional.10o Exaction activity will henceforth
be treated as regulation by the Supreme Court only when it is a true
substitute for regulation, i.e., when it is employed as an alternative to
prohibiting the requested use.101 The takings analysis employed in
GrupelO2 was retained; however, instead of asking whether the owner
has a viable use after the permit is granted, the courts now must ask
whether the owner would have a viable use if the permit were de-
nied. If this first step is passed, then the particular exaction chosen
is evaluated and must withstand a heightened level of judicial scu-
tiny. Instead of merely asking whether the condition is "reasonably
related" to the purposes of a statute authorizing exactions,103 courts
are to inquire whether the exaction substantially advances the same
legitimate governmental interest that would have justified denial of
the applicant's permit. 104
Besides the above changes to California law as it relates specifically
to permit exactions, the Nollan opinion made certain announcements
which theoretically reach beyond the borders of permit exaction law.
For example, after assuming facts that transformed the condition
from a physical invasion into a potentially valid regulation, the Court
applied the heightened level of scrutiny discussed above. The intrigu-
ing thing about this is that the Court made no apparent effort to
limit the application of this elevated level of review to dedication re-
quirements. 105 Instead, the Court referred in very general terms to
99. See, e.g., Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 578 (1985).
100. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145.
101. Id. at 3147-48.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 51-61.
103. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 678,
699, 183 Cal. Rptr. 395, 407-08 (1982).
104. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147.
105. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) is the only other opinion
in which the Court appears to have applied close judicial scrutiny in a land use case to
those situations where heightened scrutiny would apply, and repe:at-
edly referred to situations involving "permit conditions" in general,
and to "land use regulation" in general.106 Justice Brennan's dissent
criticized the majority for treating exactions differently from other
exercises of the police power in the regulation of land use.107 How-
ever, instead of defending what Justice Brennan regarded as special
treatment for exactions, the majority opinion responded by attacking
his assumption that other types of land use regulation were entitled
to a mere "rational basis" standard 'of review:
Contrary to Justice BRENNAN's claim, our opinions do not establish that
these standards are the same as those applied to due process or equal-protec-
tion claims. To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the takings field have
generally been quite different. We have required that the regulation "sub-
stantially advance" the "legitimate state interest" sought to be achieved ...
not that "the State 'could rationally have decided' the measure adopted might
achieve the State's objective ..... [T]here is no reason to believe (and the lan-
guage of our cases gives some reason to disbelieve) that so long as the regula-
tion of property is at issue the standards for takings challenges, due process
challenges, and equal protection challenges are identical; any more than there
is any reason to believe that so long as the regulation of speech is at issue the
standards for due process challenges, equal protection challenges, and First'
Amendment challenges are identical. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82
S. Ct. 987, 8 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1962), does appear to assume that the inquiries are
the same, but that assumption is inconsistent with the formulations of our
later cases. 1 0 8
The other pronouncement in Nollan which is able to cross over
into areas of the law outside the field of permit exactions is the
Court's unqualified statement that "the right to build on one's own
property . . . cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental bene-
fit.'"109 A few Supreme Court cases have stated in dicta that the
ability to use one's land is a right inhering in the ownership of prop-
erty,1 10 but never before had the right to "use" been spelled out as a
the question of whether the regulation at issue served a legitimate governmental pur-
pose. Only Justice Powell voted consistently for the use of close scrutiny in both
Moore and Nollan. The other six Justices who participated in both cases switched
sides on this issue.
106. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146 ("land use regulation does not effect a taking if it
'substantially advance[s]' legitimate state interests"); id. at 3147 (a "permit condition
that serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit
should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not consti-
tute a taking."); id. at 3148 ("the evident constitutional[ity] ... disappears, however, if
the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced
as the justification for the prohibition."); id. ("unless the permit condition serves the
same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a
valid regulation."); id. at 3150 ("as indicated earlier, our cases describe the condition
for abridgement of property rights through the police power as a 'substantial ad-
vanc[ing]' of a legitimate State interest.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 3151-52.
108. Id. at 3147 n.3 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 3146 n.2.
110. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917).
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right to "build."
The effect of a recognized right to build, combined with heightened
review for all permit conditions and building restrictions in general,
could result in the judicial reexamination of certain other doctrines
in California. For example, the validity of cases upholding permit
conditions that require something other than dedications of land is
brought into question. Logically, conditions like those upheld in Nor-
sco Enterprises v. City of Fremont,il' requiring the payment of fees
in lieu of dedication, should be reviewed in the same manner as dedi-
cations. Otherwise, the protections afforded by the Nollan decision
could be circumvented by the simple device of requiring the payment
of a fee equivalent to the value of the desired dedication. Under this
arrangement, the government agency could then condemn the prop-
erty and compensate the owner with his own money.112 Other condi-
tions require the following types of activities: the off-site
construction of replacement rental housing,113 the on-site construc-
tion of a certain percentage of low-income housing, the commitment
of a certain percentage of construction costs to publicly displayed art,
the provision of day care centers, the establishment of ride-share pro-
grams, and other similar conditions making headlines in Califor-
nia,11 4 although not necessarily involving dedications, may all have to
pass the Nollan test.
Additionally, the issue arises of how to review those situations
where land is down-zoned to prevent development. California courts
have traditionally accepted the principle in Longtin's treatise on Cali-
fornia land use law 1 5 that "[d]evelopment is a privilege not a
right."16 The Nollan concept that building on one's own property is
one of the sticks in the bundle of rights known as property owner-
ship"17 could change the result in cases like Furey v. City of Sacra-
mento,"18 which held that a down-zoning to open space is generally
not a taking where the effect is to preserve land in its historical use.
111. 54 Cal. App. 3d 488, 126 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1976).
112. See, e.g., Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898).
113. See. e.g., Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City of San Francisco, 177 Cal. App. 3d 892,
223 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1986).
114. DiMento, Nollan v. Coastal Commission: What Has Scalia Wrought?, San
Francisco Banner Daily J., July 10, 1987, at 4, col. 3.
115. R. LONGTIN, CALIFORNIA LAND USE REGULATIONS 617 (1977).
116. Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 328, 170 Cal. Rptr.
685, 691 (1981).
117. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
118. 24 Cal. 3d 862, 598 P.2d 844, 157 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1979).
This concept of a vested right to build also creates doubts about the
vitality of California vested rights law. In the leading case of Avco
Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Commission,119
the California Supreme Court refused to recognize a right to build
even after the owner had invested approximately three million dol-
lars in grading and installing of subdivision improvements. The the-
ory behind cases like Avco is that owners have no right to build until
they detrimentally rely upon a validly issued building permit. Until
the ruling in Avco, the courts regarded the ability to build on the
property as a mere expectancy of a benefit which could be withheld
by government.120 After Nollan, even if the right to construct a par-
ticular building remains unperfected until Avco's elements of estop-
pel are established, it would appear the owner's right to build
something must be recognized.
The Nollan decision also raises procedural questions. For years the
law in California has limited judicial review of government agency
decisions affecting land use rights to a "substantial evidence" stan-
dard rather than the higher scrutiny of "independent judgment." In-
dependent judgment review is required when fundamental vested
rights are at stake.121 The court in Drummey v. State Board of Fu-
neral Directors122 stated:
[T]o say that [agency] findings of fact may be made conclusive where constitu-
tional rights of liberty and property are involved, although the evidence
clearly establishes that the findings are wrong and constitutional rights have
been invaded, is to place those rights at the mercy of administrative officials
and seriously to impair the security inherent in our judicial safeguards.1 2 3
Yet subsequent cases held that property owners, absent a building
permit, 2 4 had no vested right to build.125 Therefore, agency deci-
sions affecting the ability of landowners to develop their property
were limited in review to the substantial evidence standard. The pro-
priety of employing the independent judgment standard after Nollan
arises not only from the recognition in Nollan of a vested right to
119. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976).
120. Id. at 793, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391; see also Patterson v. Central
Coast Regional Comm'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d 833, 843, 130 Cal. Rptr. 169, 175 (1976).
121. See Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 821, 567 P.2d 1162,
1172, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442, 452 (1977); Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees' Retire-
ment Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 34, 520 P.2d 29, 33, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 809 (1974); Bixby v.
Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 138, 481 P.2d 242, 247, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 239 (1971); Drummey v.
State Bd. of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, 13 Cal. 2d 75, 85, 57 P.2d 848, 854
(1939).
122. 13 Cal. 2d 75, 87 P.2d 848 (1939).
123. Id. at 85, 87 P.2d at 854 (quoting St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
298 U.S. 38, 52 (1935)).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 117-118.
125. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 722, 223
Cal. Rptr. 28, 29 (1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 687, 697, 183 Cal. Rptr. 395, 406 (1982).
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build, but also by the Court's call for a higher level of judicial inquiry
when land use decisions are under review.
VI. CONCLUSION
The two-step analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in Nollan re-
wrote California takings jurisprudence in the field of permit exac-
tions. The decision also suggests that other types of permit
conditions may likewise be required to pass the new test. Besides for-
mulating an approach for courts to use when reviewing permit condi-
tions, the Nollan Court recognized that land use permits restrict an
intrinsic property right rather than grant a governmental benefit. Fi-
nally, the Court called for a new and heightened level of judicial
scrutiny to be employed perhaps in all land use regulation cases. In
the long term, depending upon how Nollan is applied in future deci-
sions, these latter aspects of the case may rival in importance Nol-
lan's new standards for the constitutionality of exactions.

